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Vulnerable households and fuel poverty: policy targeting 






When Australia established its National Electricity Market (NEM) during the 
1990s, reforms were focused on maximising economic efficiency.  Little 
thought was given to distributional outcomes.  However, by the 2010s 
sluggish growth in household incomes, sharp rises in electricity prices and 
material increases in quantities consumed through surging uptake rates of air-
conditioning units led to the possibility of (hot climate) fuel poverty.  In the 
NEM’s Queensland region, longstanding customer hardship policy pre-dated 
the NEM.  With the benefit of hindsight, the policy was poorly configured as it 
focused exclusively on the aged population and was delivered by way of fixed 
payment.  Low income households in the family formation cohort were 
excluded from the policy despite obvious need.  In this article, Queensland’s 
longstanding customer hardship policy is refined using pre-existing (means-
tested) welfare mechanisms in order to target low income households 
including families, and the payment structure is altered from fixed ($ pa) to 
variable (% of the bill) while holding the budget constraint constant.  Changes 
to policy targeting produce material improvements in horizontal and vertical 
efficiency while changes to payment structure further enhance vertical 
performance, with the incidence and depth of residual fuel poverty reduced. 
 
Key words:  Energy Affordability, Fuel Poverty, Policy Targeting, Targeting 
Efficiency, Customer Hardship Policy. 
 
JEL Classification:  D25, D80, G32, L51, Q41. 
 
1. Introduction 
Australia was an early mover vis-à-vis economic liberalisation policies, undertaking 
extensive and broad-ranging microeconomic reforms across many industries during 
the 1980s and 1990s.  Policymakers throughout this period focused on maximising 
economic efficiency and in the aggregate, the 1990s proved to be golden decade of 
productivity, efficiency and improved living standards.1  Vertical state-based 
electricity supply monopolies were a central target of reforms.   
 
Establishment of Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM) during the 1990s 
formed part of a broader (world-wide) electricity industry microeconomic reform 
experiment.  As Pollitt (2004) and Schmalensee (2021) explain, the ‘reform wave’ 
commenced in Chile in 1982 before moving to England & Wales, and then spreading 
to various jurisdictions throughout Asia-Pacific, the US and Europe.  Considerable 
policymaking effort went into institutional design, industry restructuring and 
privatisation programs (Kessides et al., 2009).  Template objectives included 
improvements in productive, allocative and dynamic efficiency and early results 
would typically include falling generation costs, tariff reductions (including unwinding 
certain cross-subsidies), and a clearing of generation plant oversupply.   
 
 Professor of Economics, Griffith Business School, Griffith University.  
 Research Associate, Energy Policy Research Group, University of Cambridge. 
 Chief Executive Officer, Powerlink Queensland.  I am grateful for helpful comments on an earlier draft by Gavin 
Dufty (St Vincent de Paul) and Dr Joel Gilmore (Infigen Energy). The usual caveats apply – the views and remaining 
errors are those of the authors. 
1 It also underscored a record run for the Australian economy comprising 29 years of continuous economic growth 
(ie. 1991-2020, ending with Covid-19).   
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Yet with the benefit of hindsight, too little thought went into second- and third-round 
effects of microeconomic reform, and in particular, the possibility of economic gains 
being unevenly distributed throughout Australian communities (Argy, 1999; CEDA, 
2018).  To be sure, adverse distributional effects and rising inequality are not 
inevitable outcomes of a microeconomic reform.  As Creedy and Dixon (1998) 
demonstrate, structural reforms often prove to be progressive in nature, and while it 
is conceivable that monopoly reforms may produce regressive impacts, sizable initial 
gains in productive, allocative and dynamic efficiency would ordinarily offset any 
adverse distributional effects (Argy, 1999).  Further, it would be unfair (and 
inaccurate) to suggest broader distributional impacts were ignored.  As Section 2.9 
subsequently reveals, Australia has the most targeted tax and transfer system in the 
world and the practical evidence suggests Australia’s welfare system achieved its 
underlying purpose of protecting the poor from the harshest impacts of the broader 
liberalisation agenda (Argy, 1999). 
 
However, on energy reform it is not at all obvious that any thought went into policies 
relating to vulnerable households and energy affordability when Australia’s NEM was 
being formed –  something which Kessides et al., (2009) suggests was a global 
trend.   Energy reforms typically have the effect of converting the grindingly slow and 
stable pace of the traditional monopoly utility environment into one involving highly 
volatile, real-time commodity markets and establishment of contestable consumer 
markets – including retailer practices quite unfamiliar to utility customers.  
 
In the NEM’s second largest zonal market (Queensland: population 5 million, peak 
demand 10GW, energy demand 54TWh), inadequate thought vis-à-vis vulnerable 
households and energy affordability was apparent.  Queensland’s customer hardship 
policy was established in 1993 (five years prior to the establishment of the NEM) and 
there is little evidence that (household-level) distributional impacts of energy market 
reform were seriously examined by policymakers prior to reviews undertaken in 
2015-2017 (see QPC, 2016).  Refinements to policy targeting were subsequently 
made in 2017 by the Queensland Government to include low income families, and 
the analysis in this article confirms these were warranted. 
 
Context to this statement is important. The NEM’s centrepiece, an intensely 
competitive energy-only, gross pool wholesale market and its ultra-high velocity 
contestable retail market delivered low and stable prices throughout most of the late-
1990s and 2000s.  Indeed, as New Zealand’s Ministry of Economic Development 
noted in 2009, Australia had the second lowest residential electricity tariffs in the 
world2.  However, a series of industry structural events and policy responses that 
slowly built-up from 2004 onwards led to sharply rising electricity prices from 2007-
2015 (as Fig.5 later illustrates).3   
 
Escalating energy prices can be expected to produce real and growing affordability 
problems (Kessides et al., 2009).  In the case of Queensland, by 2010 the run-up in 
electricity tariffs and a coincident stalling of household incomes following the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis would bring the matter of vulnerable customers and energy 
affordability into sharp focus.  The concept of fuel poverty, the inability of a household 
to afford a social and materially necessitated energy supply (Guertler, 2012) – and a 
term quite unfamiliar to Australian policymakers at the time – was being introduced 
as a potentially material problem (see Simshauser et al., 2011; Chan, 2016; 
Awaworyi Churchill et al., 2020).   
 
2 See Simshauser, Nelson and Doan (2011). 
3 To summarise a complex set of structural and policy dynamics, blackouts in Southeast Queensland in 2004 led to a 
tightening of reliability standards, which led to a wave of new capital into the regulated electricity networks.  Various 
solar PV feed-in tariff subsidies (at both State and Commonwealth level) and transient carbon pricing schemes added 
another layer of costs.  And finally, gas prices rose sharply as the domestic market synchronised with export markets.  
For details, see Simshauser (2014). 
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Energy market policymakers dealing with vulnerable households and the acute 
subset in fuel poverty typically approach the problem from three broad policy angles, 
1). tariff design and pricing policies, 2). quantity-based initiatives including energy 
efficiency, and 3). targeted income supports to subsidise utility bills.4  Quantity 
measures relate more specifically to a household’s capital stock (i.e. housing 
structure, insulation, appliances, solar PV etc) and were historically considered the 
more important source of fuel poverty owing to the works of Boardman (1991).  But 
as definitions of fuel poverty expanded beyond ‘adequate warmth’, so too has the 
necessary policy mix.  And as Awaworyi Churchill and Smyth (2020)5 explain, in the 
Australian context refining income supports is now critical. 
 
Settling on a suitable policy mix is an especially difficult problem because intuitive, 
broad-based responses may do more harm than good.  As Bennett et al., (2002) 
illustrate in the case of households in Great Britain, and as Figure 1 subsequently 
illustrates in the case of Australian households, Engel’s Law applies – energy costs 
form a higher proportion of household expenditure as incomes falls. Consequently,  
 
• Apparently logical tariff policy strategies such as reducing or eliminating the 
fixed charge of the two-part tariff, or switching to inclining block tariff 
structures which assist low income, low consumption households (e.g. 
Pensioners) will simultaneously harm low income, large family households 
with high consumption (Bennett et al., 2002; Fankhauser and Tepic, 2007; 
Waddams Price et al., 2012; Simshauser and Downer, 2016).   
 
• Similarly in contestable retail energy markets, policies designed to limit the 
practice of price discrimination or place regulatory price caps on otherwise 
competitive market outcomes predictably leads to the evaporation of deep 
discounts – the very products which benefit vulnerable households (Hviid and 
Waddams Price, 2012; Littlechild, 2015, 2018a, 2018b; Waddams Price and 
Zhu, 2016; Simshauser and Whish-Wilson, 2017; Simshauser, 2018b; Esplin 
et al., 2020). 
 
• Further, quantity-based schemes in their various forms are complex and often 
not well understood by intended market recipients.  They frequently suffer 
from split incentives and are usually funded through raising tariff structures – 
a form of regressive taxation which harms intended beneficiaries (Nelson et 
al., 2011; Guertler, 2012; Nelson et al., 2012; Rosenow et al., 2013; 
Simshauser, 2016).   
 
The purpose of this article is to examine the role and function of ‘targeted income 
supports’ that directly subsidise utility bills, and in particular, the targeting efficiency 
of Queensland’s longstanding (1993) customer hardship policy.  As with Skoufias 
and Coady (2007), modelling and policy prescriptions are grounded firmly in standard 
welfare analysis with a focus on coverage, under-coverage and leakage in an 
ostensibly two period model.  Household Expenditure and Household Energy 
Consumption Survey data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) form critical 
inputs to the analysis. 
 
Principle findings are that Queensland’s longstanding (1993-designed) customer 
hardship policy which focused exclusively on the aged population was poorly 
targeted and the mechanism, a fixed $329 pa income support, was structured sub-
optimally.  OECD analysis indicates Australia has the most accurate tax and transfer 
system in the world vis-à-vis its distributive capacity, and when existing welfare flags 
 
4 See variously Bennett, Cooke and Waddams Price, 2002; Komives et al., 2006; Fankhauser and Tepic, 2007; 
Guertler, 2012; Nelson, Simshauser and Nelson, 2012; Simshauser and Nelson, 2012; Waddams Price, Brazier and 
Wang, 2012; Rosenow, Platt and Flanagan, 2013; Belaïd, 2018) 
5 See in particular Awaworyi Churchill and Smyth (2020, p.14). 
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within that system are used for transfers (i.e. means-tested welfare cardholders), 
material welfare gains are achievable.  Specifically, model results demonstrate 
refining the targeting to include (means-tested) low income families and pensioners 
produces sizeable improvements in horizontal efficiency, vertical efficiency, 
vulnerable customer spill-over benefit efficiency, and reduce the incidence and depth 
of fuel poverty.  Furthermore, when the policy mechanism is altered from a fixed 
payment to ‘percentage of the utility bill’ (holding program budgets constant), vertical 
efficiency, spill-over benefits and fuel poverty indicators improve further.   
 
This article is structured as follows.  Section 2 provides a review of relevant literature 
and modelling frameworks. Section 3 introduces the data.  Section 4 examines model 
results and Section 5 provides background insights as to why policy performance 
improves so significantly. Policy implications and concluding remarks follow. 
 
2. Review of Literature 
The nature of the quantitative analysis in Sections 3-5 warrant coverage of the 
literature on the origins of customer hardship and fuel poverty, the nature of poverty 
and its measurement (i.e. horizontal and vertical targeting efficiency), and a brief 
background to Australia’s tax and transfer system given its central role to improving 
program performance. 
  
 Origins of Customer Hardship 
The relationship between energy and incomes has a surprisingly long history.  The 
first analysis by economists of household expenditure and the role of energy within it 
can be traced back to Engels in 1857 (energy was then categorised as ‘fuel and 
light’).  However, it was not until Engels reframed his analysis in 18976 that its 
complex relationship was revealed – the poorer the family, the greater the proportion 
of total expenditure devoted to energy (Stigler, 1954).  
 
More than 100 years later, the pattern of energy consumption amongst households 
continues to follow Engels Law – the relationship discovered by Engels in 1897 is 
very much in-tact in 2020 - Fig.1 illustrates an Engels Curve for energy utilising 
Queensland data.  Such a relationship makes dealing with customer hardship and 
the acute subset of households in fuel poverty a particularly complex problem 
(Fankhauser and Tepic, 2007; Waddams Price et al., 2012; Welsch and Biermann, 
2017).  Compounding matters, energy is extremely price- and income-inelastic, which 
has important distributional implications for policymakers (Kessides et al., 2009; 
Byrne et al., 2021).   
 
 
6 The original analysis in 1857 categorised Utility ‘fuel and light’ but segregated household expenditures into socio-
economic groups, which revealed very little variation in energy cost across groups (i.e. 5.4 – 5.6% of income).  
However, when Engels revised the analysis and segregated households by income rather than social group, total 
expenditures on ‘fuel and light’ fell as income rose (see Stigler, 1954, especially pp97-99). 
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 QLD Energy Consumption (% of Income) vs Household Income  
 
Data Source: Australia Bureau of Statistics 
 
 Origins of Fuel Poverty 
Conceptually, fuel poverty (sometimes referred to as energy poverty7) refers to the 
inability of a household to afford a socially and materially necessitated level of 
domestic energy supply (Guertler, 2012).  The term ‘fuel poverty’ can be traced at 
least as far back as Bradshaw and Hutton (1983) and originated in response to 
adverse impacts of the 1973 OPEC oil crisis, viz. rapidly rising electricity and gas 
prices in Great Britain and Europe (see also Boardman, 1991).   
 
To generalise a complex literature, the measurement of fuel poverty has historically 
been defined as binding when household energy costs, based on a normative 
standard, exceed 10% of household disposable income.  More recent variations 
include relative thresholds, contrasting equivalised household disposable incomes 
after housing costs with relative energy costs, as Section 2.5 subsequently explains.   
 
While initially a northern hemisphere concept, a warming climate and widespread 
take-up of air-conditioners and other appliances has meant the problem of fuel 
poverty has, over time, migrated to the southern hemisphere (Simshauser, Nelson 
and Doan, 2011; Awaworyi Churchill and Smyth, 2020; Awaworyi Churchill, Smyth 
and Farrell, 2020; Mazzone, 2020).  Heat-related deaths are a problem in Australia 
(Awaworyi Churchill and Smyth, 2020) and globally, have risen by 53.7% over the 
past 20 years for those aged 65+ (Watts et al., 2021). 
 
Fuel poverty is a difficult concept, and is not the same as poverty (Boardman, 1991; 
Bennett et al., 2002; Hills, 2012).  A household can be poor but afford their energy, 
and conversely, a household with income demonstrably above the poverty line may 
not be able to afford their energy costs due to household structure, or may do so only 
at the expense of other essential items such as diet (Bradshaw and Hutton, 1983).  
Most importantly, not every energy consumer who spends above fuel poverty 
thresholds feels poor, and conversely, not every household who feels poor meets 
typical thresholds (Waddams Price et al., 2012).  This complex income expansion 
path vis-à-vis energy consumption is why fuel poverty warrants attention at all 
(Bennett et al, 2002).   
 
7 Belaïd (2018) notes the term “fuel poverty” is used in Great Britain, New Zealand and Ireland, while “energy 
poverty” tends to be used in Eastern Europe.  Other strands of the literature distinguish between fuel poverty as an 
inability to afford utility bills in the world’s most advanced economies, and energy poverty as a general lack of energy 
infrastructure in developing economies (Welsch and Biermann, 2017).  Yet another set of definitions distinguishes 
energy poverty as household electricity and gas only, with fuel poverty referring to any and all fuels used by a 
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Tangential to fuel poverty is the term ‘energy affordability’ – which has a more 
widespread use in countries such as Australia.  It can be taken to encompass a much 
broader cohort than those characterised as being in fuel poverty.  Energy affordability 
as a policy concept is, I believe, a direct adjunct (in meaning and cause) to ‘housing 
affordability’.  As Bramley (2012, p.2) explains, many countries (e.g. Great Britain, 
US, Australia) simultaneously experienced ‘massive’ growth in real house prices 
between the 1990s and late-2000s, which induced a housing affordability problem in 
multiple jurisdictions.  As Tanton and Phillips (2013) explain, from 1991-2011 
Australian house prices increased by 263% (real incomes increased 95%) and in the 
capital cities of Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne were among the most expensive in 
the world.  Axiomatically, housing stress, which is driven by the largest and least 
flexible claim over household incomes, can be expected to amplify latent energy 
affordability problems.  
 
 Principles of the measurement of poverty  
The identification and measurement of fuel poverty comprises a steadily growing 
body of research (see Jessel et al., 2019).  In the subsequent analysis, measurement 
concepts vis-vis targeting policy performance are derived from the poverty literature 
and thus it provides an important foundation for the subsequent analysis, particularly 
the seminal works of Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen, and those of Peter Townsend. 
 
Sen (1976) explains the two basic problems with measuring poverty, 1). identifying 
vulnerable households in the total population, and 2) constructing indices that 
capture changes in hardship intensity, and tax and transfers that make the problem 
worse.  Simple headcount ratios are a crude index that fail on 2). and consequently 
gave rise to Sen’s monotonicity and transfer axioms (see also Beckerman, 1979; 
Tanton and Phillips, 2013): 
 
➢ Monotonicity axiom: headcount ratios fail to capture the change in the 
intensity of (fuel) poverty if incomes and/or (energy) prices change. 
 
➢ Transfer axiom: headcount ratios fail to reflect changes in the intensity of 
(fuel) poverty if transfers occur from (fuel) poor to higher income households8. 
 
While Sen’s preferred approach to poverty analysis was normative, Townsend (1962, 
p.225) approached poverty in advanced economies as relative: 
 
…individuals and families whose resources, over time, fall seriously short of 
the resources commanded by the average individual or family in the 
community in which they live, are in poverty…  
 
Professors Sen and Townsend argued furiously over the relative merits of their 
positions yet as with Yamamori (2019), this article sits comfortably within them.  
 
 Vulnerable Households in Advanced Economies 
Beckerman (1979) noted long ago there is no objective general theory of poverty.  
Poverty lines may be established through normative standard (satisfying Sen), while 
a broader definition of ‘vulnerable household’ can be derived through a relative 
measure (satisfying Townsend).  
 
When using rule-of-thumb thresholds such as 10% for fuel poverty, 3.5% for water 
poverty or 30% for housing stress, placing coincident bounds around household 
income is important.  For example, housing studies in Australia apply a “40/30 rule”.  
Here, low income is defined as the lowest 40th percentile of household incomes, and 
housing stress is defined as more than 30% of income (Tanton and Phillips, 2013; 
 
8 For an analysis of such transfers in Queensland’s electricity industry, see Nelson et al (2012) on solar PV feed-in 
tariffs, and Simshauser (2016) and Simshauser & Downer (2016) on tariff design. 
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Rowley, Ong and Haffner, 2015).  Komives et al., (2006) and Chan (2016) use 40th 
percentile for low income in their analysis of energy and water utility bills while 
Fahmy (2011), Hills (2012). Moore (2012), Bramley (2012) and Yamamori (2019) use 
60% of median disposable household income. 
 
When analysing vulnerable households, measurement of disposable incomes should 
be equivalised.  Doing so recognises that two households with equal incomes but 
different compositions are not the same.  For example, a household with one adult 
and two children has substantially more necessities for the same quality of life than a 
household with one adult and no children (Oorschot, 2002; Stone, 2006; Kessides et 
al., 2009; Moore, 2012; Simshauser and Nelson, 2012; Waddams Price, Brazier and 
Wang, 2012).  For this purpose, the Modified OECD Scale is frequently used which 
recognises the economies of scale associated with multi-person families, and of 
differential consumption needs of adults and children (Beckerman, 1979; Stone, 
2006; Bramley, 2012; Hills, 2012; Moore, 2012; Tanton and Phillips, 2013; Rowley, 
Ong and Haffner, 2015). 
 
When examining vulnerable households and energy affordability, equivalised 
disposable income ‘after housing costs’ is appropriate, and consistent with the 
findings of Hills (2012) and others (see also Moore, 2012; Chan, 2016).  As 
Beckerman (1979) observed, quite often the reason households are vulnerable in the 
first place is due to housing costs, noting this is usually the single largest and least 
flexible charge over household disposable incomes (Stone, 2006).  Housing 
structures are also fundamental drivers of energy use (Simshauser et al., 2011; 
Simshauser and Downer, 2016). 
 
To summarise, equivalised disposable income after housing costs provides an 
important variable for defining vulnerable households and the acute subset in fuel 
poverty.  In this research, the definition of vulnerable household used is based on the 
framework contained in Balestra and Tonkin (2018) and forms the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics’ (ABS) preferred benchmark of vulnerable households, viz. those 
characterised by Low Income and Low Net Wealth, referred to by the ABS as ‘Low 
Economic Resource9’ households.  
 
 Fuel Poverty Measurement 
Recall from Section 2.2 that fuel poverty largely originated in Great Britain and 
Europe with reference to Boardman’s 1991 framing, viz. a household was said to be 
in fuel poverty when the normative cost of energy exceeded 10% for the lowest 30% 
of household incomes (see Boardman, 1991, 2012).  The 10% ratio is easily 
grasped, and is the equivalent of the ‘housing stress’ ratio of 30% used in the 
housing literature (Stone, 2006; Tanton and Phillips, 2013; Rowley, Ong and Haffner, 
2015).   
 
Stone (2006) observes ‘rule-of-thumb’ ratios fail to define an adequate minimum 
residual equivalised income after housing costs.  Rowley et al., (2015) highlight fixed 
ratios applied to all households will overstate a problem (i.e. high-income households 
can tolerate high energy costs), consequently some benchmark level of income is 
necessary to bound the definition.  
 
Operationalising equivalised incomes after housing costs and then deriving a 
normative standard of consumption is a complex task as Stone (2006) explains.  
Ratios such as the 10% fuel poverty threshold (and 30% housing stress) have the 
benefit of being simple to understand and apply, and generally align with people’s 
common-sense experience.  But as Stone (2006) argues, such convenience doesn’t 
 
9 See ABS ‘Household and Income Distribution, Australia’ Cat 6523.0 (Dec 2013) at 
https://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/6523.0Main+Features62011-12?OpenDocument  
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diminish the intellectual responsibility of policymakers for rigorous and sound 
conceptualisations.   
 
Prima facie, the fuel poverty ratio of 10% presents as part relative metric (i.e. 
Boardman’s 10% equated to approximately twice the median household expenditure 
on energy by the poorest 30% of households) and part normative standard, because 
the cost of energy was derived through a constructed standard to acquire warmth 
and the balance of energy (i.e. cost of energy required to maintain household with 
central living areas at 23o C, and outer areas at 18o C).  Observed energy costs were 
not used in original definitions and calculations (see for example Bennett et al., 2002; 
Fankhauser and Tepic, 2007; Fahmy, 2011; Boardman, 2012; Moore, 2012; 
Waddams Price, Brazier and Wang, 2012). 
 
However in a major Review in Great Britain, Hills (2012) recommended moving away 
from a normative standard to a relative analysis (i.e. empirical observation) 
comprising a low income / high cost metric.  It was noteworthy that empirical analysis 
by Hills (2012) of revealed household energy costs demonstrated use deviated 
materially from the normative standard, reinforcing the view that there is not 
necessarily any agreement on what normative standards should in fact be (Bramley, 
2012).  Evidently, British households were not maintained at normative levels of 
warmth, with residents opting for cooler configurations (on average).  Bramley (2012) 
finds similar results vis-à-vis normative standards and empirical costs for housing.   
 
This lends weight to the use of traditional affordability ratios (i.e. 10% for fuel poverty, 
30% for housing stress) since they are broadly representative of peoples reported 
payment problems.  On this basis, Bramley (2012) argues rule-of-thumb ratios can 
be justified for measurement (but not forecasting).  Similarly, the Hills Review 
recommended using 60% of the median equivalised household income after housing 
costs and the median energy spend to define the fuel poverty threshold.  
 
As an aside, only Great Britain and three EU member states (Ireland, France 
Slovakia) have formal definitions of fuel poverty.  The EU has resisted providing a 
common definition of fuel poverty but the EU’s Second and Third Energy Packages 
(ca.2011 onwards) have directed extensive efforts towards identifying vulnerable 
customers and addressing affordability.  Thomson et al. (2016), Welsch and 
Biermann (2017), Belaïd (2018), Charlier and Kahouli (2019) and Charlier and 
Legendre (2019) amongst many others provide helpful overviews of the various 
definitional options, and draw on a range of metrics to measure the depth of the 
problem.   
 
 Targeted Income Supports for Utility Bills 
Income supports to subsidise the utility bills of vulnerable households and the acute 
subset in fuel poverty may be constructed as part of a 1). universal policy (i.e. 
payments made to all households) or 2). category targeting policy.  This research 
focuses exclusively on the latter.  
 
Category targeting via means-testing is a way of limiting social expenditure while 
simultaneously flattening the distribution of market incomes, thereby contributing to 
social equality (Oorschot, 2002; Komives et al., 2006).  As a policy, ‘category 
targeting’ is typically capable of achieving a united political view because all political 
perspectives – both right and left – invariably agree on the importance and need to 
protect vulnerable households (see Besley, 1990; Oorschot, 2002).  Indeed, the 
politics of policy targeting is robust because Labor/Democrats support the effects of 
targeting (i.e. flattening market incomes and reducing inequality), while 
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Conservatives/Republicans support category targeting because the normative design 
of policy focuses on the truly needy (Oorschot, 2002).10 
 
 Measuring the Horizontal & Vertical Efficiency of Targeted Policy 
As Hoddinott (1999) notes, household-level targeting requires an aggressive effort to 
seek out the poorest in society – consequently performance measurement to ensure 
net benefits (cf. universal benefits policy) is important.  The targeting efficiency 
framework subsequently applied in Section 4 can be traced back to Beckerman 
(1979).  Specific variations relating to energy affordability and the acute subset in fuel 
poverty have been guided by Chan (2016), albeit with modifications to suit a broader 
definition of vulnerable households.   
 
When applied to energy, Beckerman’s framework elegantly captures changes in the 
depth and intensity of vulnerable households and the acute subset in fuel poverty 
along with residual fuel poverty gaps, thus satisfying Sen’s axioms (Besley, 1990; 
Besley and Kanbur, 1990; Harding and Mitchell, 1992; Creedy, 1996; Hoddinott, 
1999).  The framework analyses policy targeting through the lens of 1). horizontal 
efficiency, and 2). vertical efficiency: 
 
1) Horizontal efficiency measures the extent to which a policy treats ‘like 
households’ the same way.  Horizontal measurement therefore aims to 
capture the percentage of target households successfully included (vs. those 
excluded in error), and the percentage of households successfully excluded 
(vs. those included in error).  This is illustrated in Table 1. 
 




2) Vertical efficiency aims to measure the extent to which a policy provides 
greater support to those households that need it the most.  When both 
horizontal and vertical target efficiency is improved, the prevalence, 
incidence, and depth of customer hardship and fuel poverty is reduced 
(Beckerman, 1979; Harding and Mitchell, 1992; Creedy, 1996; Herscovitch 
and Stanton, 2008; Chan, 2016).  The measurement of vertical efficiency is 
illustrated in Fig.2. 
 
 
10 Policy targeting should not be taken for its own sake because means-testing is ultimately costly (Besley and 
Kanbur, 1990; Hoddinott, 1999; Oorschot, 2002; Komives et al., 2006).  Nonetheless, the case for targeting 
vulnerable households and the acute subset in fuel poverty (cf. universal provision of income supports) is both logical 
and intuitive when budget constraints are binding (Creedy, 1996; Hoddinott, 1999; Oorschot, 2002). 
Low Income High Income
Included Success Inclusion Error
Excluded Exclusion Error Success
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A  =  Fuel Poor Household, successfully targeted 
B1 =  Fuel Poor Household, successfully targeted, spill-over benefit 
B2 =  Low Income Household, successfully targeted, spill-over benefit 
C  =  Not Low Income, inclusion error 
D  =   Fuel Poor Household, successfully targeted, inadequate benefits provided 
E1 =  Fuel Poor Household, exclusion error 
E2 =  Low Income Household, exclusion error 
 
From these variables, various measures of vertical efficiency can be constructed, as 
follows: 
 






                (1)  
 
𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠 = 𝐴 + 𝐵1 ,             (2)  
 
𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 =
(𝐴+𝐵1+𝐵2)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 
 ,         (3) 
 
𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠 =  
(𝐵1+𝐵2)
(𝐴+𝐵1+𝐵2)
 ,              (4) 
 
𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 =  
𝐴
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
 ,              (5) 
 
𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 =
𝐶
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
 ,        (6) 
 
𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 =  
(𝐸1+𝐸2)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
 ,    (7) 
 
𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 =
𝐷
(𝐴+𝐵1+𝐵2)
 ,                   (8)  
 
 Modified FGT Fuel Poverty Index - depth of customer hardship 
An important contribution to the analysis of poverty is contained in Foster, Greer and 





y = Equivalised Income 
After Housing Costs
(Rank Order)
Fuel Poverty Benchmark, r
(e.g. > 10% of Income)





e = Electricity Bill 
(% of Income, pre Policy)
e* = Electricity Bill
(% of Income, post {Policy)
Fuel Poor - Post Policy
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Poverty Rate’ (see also Besley, 1990; Besley and Kanbur, 1990; Creedy, 1996; 
Hoddinott, 1999; Skoufias and Coady, 2007; Tanton and Phillips, 2013).  Foster et 
al.’s (1984) measure of poverty satisfies Sen’s axioms with the help of the variable 
(𝛼) which when set to a value of 2 (or higher) places a greater weight on those below 
the defined poverty threshold. Critically, the metric intensifies as conditions worsen:   
 
𝐸𝑆(𝛼)  =  
1
𝑛








 | 𝑧 =
𝑒𝑖
𝑦𝑖
 ,                     (9)  
 
In Eq.9, 𝑧 forms the poverty benchmark, relevant household expenditure is 
represented by 𝑒𝑖 and in this instance z is calculated by reference to a rule-of-thumb 
ratio relative to household income, 𝑦𝑖 for the 𝑖
 th household.  When the variable (𝛼) is 
set to a value of 0, the formula collapses to a simple headcount ratio.  As with the 
horizontal and vertical target efficiency metrics contained in Section 2.7, the FGT 
Poverty Rate can also be modified for use in the analysis of energy affordability, viz. 
‘Modified FGT Fuel Poverty Index’ focused on fuel poverty. 
 
 Australia’s tax and transfer system 
Before turning to the quantitative analysis of policy targeting of Queensland's 
vulnerable households and the acute subset in fuel poverty, it is helpful to provide a 
brief overview of Australia’s tax and transfer system given its central role to refining 
policy.   
 
Australia’s tax and transfer system differs markedly from international norms.  The 
current system was gradually built up and refined over more than a century, and, has 
proven to be remarkably resilient throughout time (Herscovitch and Stanton, 2008).  It 
is characterised by a highly targeted redistributive strategy (cf. market incomes) with 
an overall objective of reducing the incidence and depth of poverty, and an emphasis 
on horizontal and vertical efficiency.  Policy architectures aim to maximise economic 
and social participation subject to minimising administrative burdens and budget 
constraints – an approach which has long enjoyed bipartisan support for reasons set 
out in Section 2.6 and in particular those highlighted more generally by Besley 
(1990), Oorschot (2002) and Komives et al., (2006).  
 
Australian welfare strategy has a long history of targeting.  Targeting can be traced 
back to 1900 when a means-tested Aged Pension Scheme funded through general 
revenues with no link to prior earnings was established, making it the third aged 
pension scheme deployed globally (following Denmark in 1891 and New Zealand in 
1898).  Means-tested Pension schemes were initially established by Australia’s three 
largest States, viz. New South Wales and Victoria (1900) and Queensland (1907) 
before being consolidated by Australia’s Commonwealth Government in 1909 
(Herscovitch and Stanton, 2008).  Queensland also has a long history of targeted 
policy.  Beyond the Pension scheme in 1907, Queensland introduced the nation’s 
first unemployment scheme in 1923, more than two decades before being absorbed 
by a Commonwealth scheme.  Many other welfare developments in Australia, while 
initially fragmented at the State level, were consolidated at the national level and by 
the end of World War II, a highly stable and mature welfare state existed 
(Herscovitch and Stanton, 2008). 
 
Australia’s tax and transfer system can be thought of as part of an ‘Anglo-Saxon 
model’ (i.e. small cash transfers, tax mix focusing on redistribution).  However, 
Australian transfers are characterised by being very highly targeted to low income 
groups with extensive use of means-testing, funded by a progressive taxation 
system11. Indeed, as Joumard et al., (2012) explain, Australia’s welfare state has the 
highest target efficiency vis-à-vis lowest quintile income households amongst OECD 
countries, as illustrated in Fig.3. 
 
11 See also Joumard et al., (2012), especially Figures 4 and 7 respectively.   
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 Public social cash benefits paid to lowest & highest quintiles 
 
Source:  OECD Social Expenditure Update (2014)12 
 
While the welfare state is largely the domain of the Commonwealth Government, 
energy and utility policy resides with State Governments, and consequently targeted 
income supports to subsidise the energy bills of vulnerable customers and the acute 
subset in fuel poverty are orchestrated at the State level.  State Governments are 
able to draw on Commonwealth means-tested welfare flags (i.e. various 
cardholders), meaning that at the margins administrative setup costs of refining 
State-based programs to target vulnerable households can be considered trivial.  
And as Awaworyi Churchill and Smyth (2020) explain, doing so has become critical. 
 
3. Data 
In the analysis of affordability and poverty, use of microdata is considered the ‘gold 
star standard’ (Skoufias and Coady, 2007).  In this article, microdata compiled by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) is used. The 2015 Survey of Income and 
Housing (Series 6541) comprises household-level data from across Australia on 
incomes, assets and liabilities, housing type, housing costs, and welfare flags (i.e. 
Commonwealth Cardholders) from a sample of ~14,000 households. Furthermore, 
the ABS’s accompanying Household Expenditure Survey (Series 4670) is also used 
as it incorporates detailed energy consumption by household type (e.g. dwelling 
structure, family composition, region and so on) and has been matched by the ABS 
to Series 6541 data, making the broader dataset quite unique. Survey results are 
appropriately weighted to Queensland’s 1.765 million households with one 
noteworthy caveat – ‘very remote’ areas of Queensland are not captured or 
represented by the data (i.e. approximately 30,000 households). 
 
3.1 Defining Vulnerable – Low Income vs. Low Economic Resource 
Recall from Section 2 that definitions of ‘low income’ varied, for example 1). 60% of 
median income (Bramley, 2012; Hills, 2012; Moore, 2012; Yamamori, 2019),  and 2). 
40th percentile income (Komives et al., 2006; Tanton and Phillips, 2013; Rowley, 
Ong and Haffner, 2015; Chan, 2016).  Recall also from Section 2.4 that Balestra and 
Tonkin (2018) and the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ preferred definition of 
vulnerable household is those characterised as ‘Low Economic Resource’.  In an 
applied sense, this is derived by reference to the cross-over between the 40th 
percentile equivalised household disposable income, and 40th percentile equivalised 
household net wealth.  For policy targeting of vulnerable households and the acute 
 
12 Available at OECD Social Expenditure Update, 2014, https://www.oecd.org/…/OECD2014-Social-Expenditure-








Public Social Benefits 
(Benefits Paid %)
Lowest 20% disposable income Highest 20% disposable income
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subset in fuel poverty, this provides a very robust definition of the poorest 
Queensland households (i.e. lowest 20th percentile).  It is therefore the definition 
used in the subsequent analysis of horizontal and vertical targeting efficiency.   
 
ABS microdata for Queensland’s Low Economic Resource households is illustrated 
in Fig.4, with Equivalised Household Wealth measured on the x-axis, and Equivalised 
Household Income measured on the y-axis. 
 




The intuition of this approach is that Household Net Wealth represents the stock of 
material resources and is complementary to the flow of Household Incomes (Balestra 
and Tonkin, 2018).  Conditions facing low income households are axiomatic, and 
evidently, a household with Low Net Wealth is ‘economically vulnerable’.  
 
To summarise the data in Fig.4, recall there are 1.765m households in Queensland.  
The 40th percentile equivalised income is $669.46 per week, which captures 705,201 
households.  The 40th percentile equivalised net wealth is $258,772 and captures 
705,153 households.  The cross-over of these two segments (dashed boxed area in 
Fig.4) captures 336,911 ‘Low Economic Resource’ households.  They form the 
lowest quintile – Queensland’s ‘vulnerable households’. 
 
3.2 Queensland Customer Hardship Policy: Old (1993) vs. Revised  
Queensland’s longstanding customer hardship policy was implemented in 1993, pre-
dating NEM commencement by at least five years.  The policy delivery mechanism 
comprises a payment of ~$329 per annum, applied in equal Quarterly instalments 
against target household energy bills, delivered directly from the Queensland 
Government to the household’s energy retailer.13  The 1993 policy’s category 
targeting framework comprised two targets, as follows: 
 
1) means-tested Pension Cardholders, and  
 
13 Queensland households are primarily ‘all electric’.  Being a hot climate, natural gas has a very low market share in 
Queensland (~150,000 households) and use is typically minimal and limited to cooking appliances. Some households 
with access to natural gas also use the fuel for their hot water system.  However, many households (including the 
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2) non means-tested Queensland Seniors Cardholders.   
   
The program budget (2017$) was ~$160m per annum and as the parameters above 
make clear, category targeting centred on the aged (65+ years) demographic.  
Policymakers were aware policy parameters required some level of revision and 
adjustment from ~2012, when the concept of energy affordability began to take on a 
central narrative in Australian media14.   
 
However, the business of government is congested. Policymaking in highly 
specialised areas such as energy typically do not follow a conventional or 
methodological process.  On the contrary, policymaking is ‘often chaotic, fragmented, 
contingent and arational’ as Tiernan and Burke (2002) explain (see also Jones, 2014; 
Peters and Hertel, 2017; Simshauser, 2018a). In a practical sense, a political window 
needs to be ‘prised open’ to create the opportunity for review and deployment 
(Tiernan and Burke, 2002; Jones, 2014; Howlett, McConnell and Perl, 2015; 
Simshauser and Tiernan, 2019).  The sustained run-up in residential electricity tariffs 
during 2008-2015 (see Fig.5) created these conditions, and a window appeared in 
2015-2017 at which point welfare enhancing refinements were made.  However, for 
the purpose of defining optimal policy, the subsequent analysis ignores these 
changes and commences with the 1993 ‘Old Policy’.  
 
 QLD Average Residential Electricity Tariff (1955-2021) 
 
Data Sources:  ESAA, QCA, ABS. 
 
To be welfare enhancing, revision of the 1993 policy requires focus on two key 
objectives, improving horizontal target efficiency and vertical target efficiency, holding 
program budgets constant: 
 
➢ Improving the horizontal efficiency of the 1993 ‘Old Policy’ hinges on 
improving the accuracy of category targeting via use of existing welfare flags.  
Available welfare flags from the Commonwealth Government’s various 
means-tested schemes exist in the ABS data set (e.g. Pension Card, War 
Veterans Card, Family Tax Rebate Beneficiaries, Health Cardholders 
amongst others).  To simplify an otherwise lengthy description of available 
options – given an objective function of enhancing energy affordability for 
vulnerable households, and to reduce the incidence and depth of the acute 
subset of households in fuel poverty, a combination of the Commonwealth 
 
14 For example, see Fig.7 in Simshauser and Laochumnanvanit (2012) which shows the sharp runup in media 
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Government’s ‘Pension Card’ and ‘Health Card’ provides an unambiguously 
optimal set of welfare flags. 
 
➢ To further improve scheme vertical efficiency, the payment mechanism of 
$329 per annum can be enhanced by shifting to a variable rate based on the 
‘percentage of the bill’ for households.  Given a program budget constraint, 
equivalence occurs when the variable rate is set to 22.5% of qualifying 
household energy bills (as Table 3 later reveals).   
 
A summary of the Old Policy and ‘Revised Policy’ is presented in Table 2.   
 
 Queensland Vulnerable Customer Policy 
 
 
Shifting from fixed ($329) to variable (22.5%) targeted income supports to subsidise 
utility bills has two primary benefits, 1). greater support is provided to very high 
summer invoices (the point a vulnerable household is likely to tip into energy bill 
distress), and 2). households with greater need receive greater absolute support.   
 
I am aware of the argument that ‘percentage of the bill’ targeted income supports to 
subsidise utility bills encourages the inefficient use of energy (see for example QPC, 
2016, pp302-303).  In a mature debate on customer hardship and the acute subset in 
fuel poverty, such arguments are not helpful.  The problem with truly vulnerable 
households is not that they use too much energy.  The problem is that vulnerable 
households don’t have enough money.  They have insufficient funds to pay for their 
energy bills, to buy more efficient appliances, to install solar PV, to generally improve 
their capital stock and reduce consumption.   
 
Fig.6 provides a Venn Diagram to conceptualise likely effects of targeting vis-à-vis 
inclusions and exclusions given the three welfare flags. Note in Fig.6 there are 
1,765,000 Queensland households in total.  Of these, 336,911 are defined as 
vulnerable, i.e. Low Economic Resource (LER).  There are 383,000 (non means-
tested) Queensland Senior Cardholders, 427,000 means-tested Pension 
Cardholders, and 211,000 means-tested Health Cardholders.  There are two key 
results in Fig.6 relating to targeting: 
 
1. By excluding Queensland Seniors, 82,000 Cardholders will be excluded and 
of these, 5% are ‘LER’ vulnerable households.  All other vulnerable Seniors 
Cardholders either have a Pension Card (221,000 households), a Health 
Card (47,000 households) or both, i.e. Pension and Health Cards (32,000 
households). 
 
2. By including Health Cardholders, 103,000 households excluded under the Old 
Policy would become Revised Policy targets.  The importance of this is that 
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more than half (57%) are defined as LER vulnerable households, many from 
the ‘family formation’ cohort where energy affordability problems are prevalent 
as Section 5 and Fig.10 subsequently reveal. 
 
 Venn Diagram – Pension Card, Qld Seniors Card, Health Card Holders 
 
Data Source: ABS. 
 
4. Modelling Results 
Model results focus on the analysis of three key aspects of the change in policy 
targeting as presented in Section 2, specifically - 1). horizontal target efficiency, 2). 
vertical target efficiency, and 3). Modified FGT Fuel Poverty Index. 
  
4.1 Horizontal Target Efficiency 
Recall horizontal efficiency measures the extent to which a policy treats ‘like 
households’ in the same way.  Measurement focuses on the accuracy of successful 
targeting of the 336,911 vulnerable households in Fig.6.  The analysis contrasts 
horizontal efficiency of the Old and Revised Policy, the extent of inclusion error (i.e. 
non-vulnerable households who benefit from the policy), and of exclusion error (i.e. 
vulnerable households not captured by the policy), and ‘successful exclusion’ – the 
raison d’etre for means-testing in the first place.   
 
Model results are illustrated in Fig.7.  Successful targeting of Queensland’s 
vulnerable households under the Revised Policy increases from 51% to 68% (Fig.7a) 
– a material step-change improvement through a relatively straight forward 
administrative decision involving a pre-existing, means-tested welfare flag (i.e. 
inclusion of Commonwealth Health Cardholders). 
 
Fig.7b provides the detailed analysis of horizontal efficiency.  Notice the Old Policy 
successfully targets 172,772 of Queensland’s 336,911 vulnerable households.  
Therefore, the Old Policy exclusion error is (336,911 – 172,772) = 164,139 
Total Queensland Households:  1,765,000
Low Economic Resource H’holds: 336,911
Old Policy Household Targeting: 556,389 (Low Economic Resource: 172,772)
New Policy Household Targeting:  557,264 (Low Economic Resource: 227,855)
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households.  By expanding category targeting to include Health Cardholders, the 
Revised Policy captures an additional ~55,000 households, which move from the Old 
Policy Exclusion Error ‘bucket’ to the Revised Policy Successful Targeting ‘bucket’, 
with the total rising from 172,772 to 227,855 households.  Furthermore, by removing 
Queensland Seniors Cardholders, ~34,000 non-means tested households exit the 
scheme and the horizontal ‘Inclusion Error’ reduces from 383,617 to 349,408 
households.   
 
 Horizontal Target Efficiency – Old Policy v Revised Policy 
 
7a – Horizontal Efficiency (% of Vulnerable Households) 
 
 
7b – Horizontal Efficiency (Household numbers) 
 
 
4.2 Vertical Target Efficiency 
A significant limitation of the horizontal efficiency analysis presented in Fig.7 is that it 
measures ‘headcount’.  It says nothing of the depth of hardship facing vulnerable 
households and the acute subset in fuel poverty.  Thus, our analysis must now turn 
to a vertical analysis.  Recall vertical efficiency measures are designed to gauge the 
incidence and depth of the problem, and the extent to which a policy provides greater 
support to those households that need help the most.  Three distinct policy scenarios 








Vulnerable Queensland Households Successfully Targeted (%)
Horizontal LER Target Accuracy Horizontal LER Target Exclusion
LER Household 
Targeting Accuracy 













Number of Queensland Households (N = 1,765,398)
Successful Targeting Inclusion Error Exclusion Error Successful Exclusion
Inclusion Error improved by ~34,000
households, now Successfully Excluded
Exclusion Error reduced by 




Low Ec. Resource Households: 227,855 (Success) + 109,056 (Excl.) = 336,911
Low Ec. Resource Households: 172,772 (Success) + 164,139 (Excl.) = 336,911
 Page 18 
1) The Old Policy (1993) comprising Pension Card and Queensland Seniors 
Cardholders, with targeted income support of $329 per annum.   
2) A Revised Policy, Queensland Seniors Cardholders excluded, Health 
Cardholders included, with targeted income support maintained at $329 per 
annum, and  
3) Revised Policy with the mechanism changed to 22.5% of the household 
electricity bill. 
 
Critically, the difference between 2) and 3) provides vertical efficiency insights over 
the payment mechanism, i.e. fixed vs. percentage of the bill.  The first point to note 
(Fig.8a) is that Vertical Efficiency (the ratio of Successful Targeting of fuel poor + 
Spill-Over Benefits to vulnerable households to Total Program Cost) improves 
considerably, from 31.1% to 40.1%.  Second, note in Fig.8b the quantum of funds 
going directly to the fuel poor more than doubles, from $17.1m (i.e. $13.1m + $4.0m 
in ‘B1’ Spill-Over Benefits) to $35.2 million (i.e. $29.6m + $5.6m in ‘B1’ Spill-Over 
Benefits). 
 
 Vertical target efficiency – Old vs Revised ($329 & 22.5% Policy Revisions) 
 













 Old Policy $329
Revised Policy $329
Revised Policy 22.5%










 Old Policy $329
Revised Policy $329
Revised Policy 22.5%
A.  Successful Targeting (Fuel Poor)
B1.  Spillover Benefits (Fuel Poor)
B2. Spillover Benefits (Low Economic Resource)
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The full vertical analysis of policy targeting efficiency is presented in Tab.3.  Note 
vertical efficiency Eq.1-7 outlined in Section 2.6 appear at Lines 9-15.  With Tab.3 the 
first point worth noting is Total Program Costs (Line 7).  The Old Policy equates to 
$183.0m (100% enrolment) and the New Policy ranges from $180.7-$189.9m.  
Second, benefits received by the most vulnerable households (Line 8) increases 
significantly with the Revised Policy mechanism, from c.$17.2m to $35.2m per 
annum.   
 
 Vertical Target Efficiency – Old Policy v New Policy 
 
 
Vertical efficiency metrics (Tab.3, Lines 9-16) all favour the Revised Policy with a 
payment mechanism in the form of 22.5% of the electricity bill.  The one metric which 
deteriorates relative to the Old Policy is ‘Inadequate Concession Benefits’ at Line 15 
(where a lower result represents improvement). However, while it appears to have 
deteriorated, recall the Old Policy captures less of Queensland’s vulnerable 
households. 
 
4.3 Analysis of Fuel Poverty - Modified FGT Fuel Poverty Index 
The final aspect of analysis focuses exclusively on the acute subset of vulnerable 
households in fuel poverty.  Thus far in the analysis, a fuel poverty threshold of 10% 
has been used and this is, of course, a generalised rule-of-thumb.  It is helpful to 
illustrate alternate metrics and thresholds and for this purpose a Modified FGT Fuel 
Poverty Index is used.  The nature of the FGT calculation is that it is well suited to a 
fixed benchmark.   
 
To illustrate an alternate threshold suitable for a Modified FGT Fuel Poverty Index 
calculation, the analysis turns to the framework contained in Great Britain’s Hills 
(2012) Review.  This defines fuel poor households by reference to 60% of Median 
Household Equivalised Income After Housing Costs and Median Household 
Electricity Costs.  The Index analysis for Queensland (Eq.9) is presented in Tab.4.   
 
Note in Tab.4 there are 299,117 Queensland households (Line 2) that meet the Hills 
(2012) definition of ‘low income’, households with equivalised income after housing 
POLICY VERTICAL EFFICIENCY ($ per annum) Old Policy Revised Policy Revised Policy
LINE Benefit per annum $329 $329 22.5%
1 A. Successful Targeting (Fuel Poor) $13,195,000 $22,104,000 $29,650,000
2 B1 Spillover Benefits (Fuel Poor) $4,034,000 $5,650,000 $5,615,000
3 B2 Spillover Benefits (Low Economic Resource, not Fuel Poor) $39,613,000 $47,210,000 $37,191,000
4 C Inclusion Expense (Not Low Ec. Resource, not Fuel Poor) $126,210,000 $114,955,000 $108,305,000
5 D Included but Inadequate (Still Fuel Poor) $19,961,000 $38,716,000 $31,390,000
6 E Exclusion Inadequacy (Low Economic Resource) $54,002,000 $40,096,000 $40,096,000
7 Total Program Cost ∑ (A, B1, B2, C) $183,052,000 $189,920,000 $180,761,000
8 Benefits Received by Fuel Poor ∑ (A, B1,) $17,229,000 $27,754,000 $35,265,000
POLICY VERTICAL EFFICIENCY (%)
9 Vertical Efficiency ∑ (A, B1, B2) / Total Prog. Cost 31.1% 39.5% 40.1%
10 Spill-over benefits ∑ (B1, B2) / ∑ (A,B1, B2) 76.8% 70.5% 59.1%
11 Poverty reduction efficiency A / Total Program Cost 23.2% 29.5% 40.9%
12 Spill-over Excess (% of Total) ∑ (B1, B2) / Total Prog. Cost 23.8% 27.8% 23.7%
13 Inefficency due to inclusion C / Total Program Cost 68.9% 60.5% 59.9%
14 Ineffeciency due to exclusion E / Total Program Cost 29.5% 21.1% 22.2%
15 Inadequate concession benefits D / Total Program Cost 10.9% 20.4% 17.4%
16 Benefit inadequacy ∑ (D, E) / Total Prog. Cost 40.4% 41.5% 39.5%
NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS Old Policy Revised Policy Change
17 A. Successful Targeting (Fuel Poor) 52,368 84,360 31,992
18 B1 Spillover Benefits (Fuel Poor) 20,817 29,320 8,503
19 B2 Spillover Benefits (Low Economic. Resource) 120,404 143,495 23,092
20 C Inclusion Expense (Not Low Ec. Resource) 383,617 349,408 -34,209 
21 D Inadequate Included 31,551 56,839 25,288
22 E Exclusion Inadequacy 164,139 109,056 -55,083 
23 F Total Households Included ∑ (A, B2, C) 556,389 577,264 20,875
24 % of Total Households F / 1,765,398 31.5% 32.7% 1.2%
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costs less than 60% of the median (i.e. $343.20 per week).  Median household 
energy costs are $24.43 (Line 4) and with No Policy, 155,447 households (8.8% of 
Queensland) are in fuel poverty.  The depth of fuel poverty is measured at $103.8 
million (Line 7).  The Revised Policy reduces the number of households in fuel 
poverty to 115,812, and the depth of the problem falls to $67.4m.   
 
 Modified FGT Fuel Poverty Index  
(Fuel Poverty = 60% x Median Equiv. Household Income and > Median Energy Cost) 
 
 
In Tab.4, the Modified FGT Fuel Poverty Index commences at 0.043 with No Policy.  
The Old Policy did reduce the incidence and depth of hardship with the Index falling 
to 0.038.  However, note the Revised Policy has a profound effect with the Index 
reducing to 0.029 noting that doing so is done with the same program budget, thus 
adding further weight to horizontal and vertical results. 
 
5. Source of improved targeting efficiency 
The horizontal efficiency, vertical efficiency and Modified FGT Fuel Poverty Index 
results presented in Section 4 show material improvements via a Revised Policy. 
Category targeting of means-tested Health Cardholders was central to the 
improvement.  Recall from Tab.3 changing the mechanism from fixed ($329) to 
variable (22.5%) further enhanced vertical15 efficiency.   
 
Why is this?  The answer can be derived from Engel’s (1897) analysis and relates to 
the relationship, or lack thereof, between absolute household incomes and energy 
consumption.  Fig.9 presents Queensland household data and highlights an R2 of 
just 0.007.  This chart replicates Bennett et al., (2002) who similarly plotted British 
household incomes and energy consumption, and derived an R2 of 0.04.  As they 
explain, the household energy cost relationship with income expansion is complex – 
it ‘scatters’ rather than trends.   
 
 
15 For clarity, changing the mechanism has no impact (either way) on horizontal efficiency. 
FGT Poverty Analysis No Policy Old Policy Revised Policy
1 Total Households 1,765,000 1,765,000 1,765,000
2 Total Number of Low Income Households 299,117 299,117 299,117
3 Benchmark (60% of Median Equiv. Income) $343.20 $343.20 $343.20
4   and Median Household Energy Cost $24.43 $24.43 $24.43
5 Households in Fuel Poverty 155,447 123,884 115,812
6 Ratio of Households in Fuel Poverty 8.8% 7.0% 6.6%
7 Depth of Fuel Poverty $103,866,000 $83,689,000 $67,462,000
8 FGT Poverty Index 0.043 0.038 0.029
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 Qld Equivalised Incomes (after housing costs) vs Electricity Bill 
 
 
An important piece of the ‘vulnerable customer puzzle’ is presented in Fig.10, which 
has been reproduced from Simshauser and Nelson (2012). Fig.10 presents an ‘age’ 
and ‘hardship’ analysis of 2.4 million residential energy customers, incorporating 3 
million electricity and gas accounts and spanning more than 12 million (Quarterly) 
invoices from the NEM’s Queensland, New South Wales, Victorian and South 
Australian regions (i.e. 25% of NEM households).  The 2012 data allocates 
households into ‘age buckets’ (x-axis) which are then grouped into various 
‘demographic cohorts’.  For example, energy accountholders in the ‘30 to 34’ year 
‘age bucket’ form part of the Family Formation cohort.   
 
 Energy Market Death Spiral 
 
Source: Simshauser & Nelson (2012) 
 
The white bar series in Fig.10 plots the distribution of household customers (average 
age 52 years).  The black and grey line series present various customer payment 
metrics which help explain the nature of customer hardship, and why changed policy 













-$10,000 $15,000 $40,000 $65,000 $90,000 $115,000 $140,000 $165,000 $190,000
Equivalised Household Income After Housing Costs ($)




Education & career 
formation 
Family formation Empty nesters Active retired
Sedentary 
retired





















Age of Head of Household
Distribution of Head 
of Household (%) 
Staying Connected, n = 8760 Dunning Level 3 & 4, n= 384,000
Disconnected, n = 20,000 AGL Customer Base, N=2.4 million
 Page 22 
willingness, but not the capacity, to pay their energy bill while ‘Dunning Level 3 & 4’ 
households have very overdue accounts).  Note that the distribution of the line series 
visibly peaks in the Family Formation cohort (i.e. 40 to 44 year age bucket), and not 
the aged cohorts. The average age of Hardship Customers is 45 years.  While not 
illustrated in Fig.10, the Family Formation cohort spend considerably more on energy 
(i.e. between +13 to +30% above average), while all other cohorts spend less than 
average. These results are consistent with the findings of Waddams Price et al., 
(2012), who also found the role of incomes and family structure (in Great Britain) to 
be important in the analysis of vulnerable households and the more acute subset in 
fuel poverty.  
  
6. Policy implications and concluding remarks 
The purpose of this article was to analyse the efficacy of a long-standing customer 
hardship policy in the NEM’s Queensland region.  Designed in 1993, the policy 
targeted aged households via Pension Card and Queensland Seniors Cardholders.  
Following reviews in 2015-2017, policy targeting was altered by the Queensland 
Government to include means-tested Health Cardholders. Modelling results in this 
article suggest policy changes were warranted.  
 
The matter of energy affordability in Australia rose to prominence from 2012.  
Preceding this, housing prices in Australian capital cities had risen by 263% over the 
period 1991-2011.  Further, average household energy consumption in Queensland 
increased markedly between 1993-2010 given a warming climate, rising incomes, 
and the widespread uptake of air-condition units.  Compounding matters, electricity 
tariffs surged from 2007-2015 (Fig.5).  Large households in the Family Formation 
cohort were adversely affected, noting they consume (on average) between 13-30% 
more than other cohorts.  Collectively, these conditions led to a sharp focus on 
energy affordability and introduced the possibility of rising fuel poverty – terminology 
quite unfamiliar to Australian policymakers at the time.   
 
In the case of Queensland, the architecture of the longstanding 1993 policy was 
poorly targeted.  It did not envisage customer hardship beyond the aged (65+ years).  
The Family Formation cohort in particular was excluded in spite of results in Fig.10.  
Analytical results from Section 4-5 confirm cohorts other than the aged are prevalent 
in the customer hardship statistics.     
 
6.1 Improving targeting efficiency 
Improving horizontal efficiency, vertical efficiency and Modified FGT Fuel Poverty 
Index efficiency of Queensland’s customer hardship policy at low administrative cost 
is credible because of Australia’s tax and transfer system. No other country in the 
OECD has a system with such accurate transfer capacity (Fig.3).  Using existing 
Commonwealth welfare structures enables vulnerable households – those defined as 
Low Economic Resource (i.e. low income and low net wealth) – to be more 
effectively targeted by expanding the policy to Health Cardholders, which has a 
prevalence of low-income families.  Cash benefits to families are known to have 
strong redistributive impacts (Joumard, Pisu and Bloch, 2012).  At the same time, the 
economy of the program could be maintained by excluding Queensland Seniors 
Cardholders, who are not means tested.   
 
Economic calculus frequently differs from political calculus – a decision to exclude 
Queensland Seniors Cardholders is likely to be very difficult.  Yet a genuinely 
vulnerable Queensland Seniors Cardholder will qualify for the Pension Card.   
 
The Fig.6 Venn Diagram demonstrated conceptually how including Health 
Cardholders and excluding Queensland Seniors Cardholders would capture a greater 
number of vulnerable households.  Results in Figs.7-8 showed the Revised Policy 
increases horizontal efficiency from 51% to 68%, and vertical efficiency increases 
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from 31.1% to 40.1%.  Tab.3 revealed altering category targeting would result in 
Poverty Reduction Efficiency rising from 23.2% to 29.5% with the payment 
mechanism maintained at $329 per annum.  Poverty Reduction Efficiency could be 
further improved, from 29.5% to 40.9%, by altering the payment mechanism to 
‘22.5% of the electricity bill’. 
 
6.2 Minimising program leakage and inclusion error 
An objective function of policy targeting is to minimise inclusion error.  However, it is 
important to note that inclusion error is inevitable.  As Hills (2012) explains, it would 
be naïve to think policies aimed at removing problems faced by 336,000 households 
could be dealt with by only treating 336,000 homes.  In practical terms a wider group 
must be targeted.  To be perfectly clear on this point, acknowledging budget 
constraints, it is generally more desirable to minimise under-coverage and exclusion 
error than to limit leakage and inclusion error (Hoddinott, 1999). 
  
As an absolute general conclusion, income supports and targeting are not solely 
designed to reduce poverty, and this notion should extend to policies designed to 
provide targeted income supports to subsidise energy bills.  Spill-over benefits (recall 
segments B1 and B2 from Fig.2, and Lines 2 & 3 in Tab.3) should not be viewed as 
‘bad’.  In my view, spill-over benefits to genuinely vulnerable households are 
desirable because they contribute to social welfare (see also Creedy, 1996) and 
consequently Eq.3 was adjusted to reflect this (i.e. by adding B1, B2). And while the 
economic principles of optimal targeting may be straightforward, other political and 
policy objectives such as reducing inequality, societal perceptions of equity, 
administrative efficiency and the political economy of decision making are all 
important and will invariably influence and guide targeting policy in practice as 
Beckerman (1979) and Besley and Kanbur (1990) explain. 
 
6.3 Practical limitations of Successful Inclusion (i.e. exclusion error) 
The sobering aspect of the analysis presented in Section 4 is that, despite having the 
world’s most targeted tax and transfer system, horizontal targeting of vulnerable 
households in Queensland ‘maxed out’ at 68%.  By implication, 32% of vulnerable 
households will slip through the net, absent other initiatives.   
 
Program targeting of Queensland’s vulnerable households could be improved, albeit 
marginally, through ongoing inclusion of Queensland Seniors Cardholders, and 
expanding the policy by adding, for example, Veterans Cardholders.  But this would 
present as a very different proposition from a program economy perspective.  The 
benefit would be an increase of 2-3 percentage points in vulnerable household 
horizontal targeting coverage, but with a program cost blow-out of ~30+%, a very 
large increases in inclusion error, and deteriorating aggregate horizontal and vertical 
efficiency metrics.  Proceeding with such a broad policy is of course a legitimate 
political decision, but unlikely to be an economic one given other important 
competing claims over scarce State Government fiscal resources. 
 
Finally, there are reasons why higher levels of vulnerable household coverage are 
rarely achieved in practice under a targeting policy.  First, as Skoufias and Coady 
(2007) note, receipt of transfer benefits is contingent on category targeting 
parameters and multiple objectives lie behind transfer programs and welfare flags 
including the use of rules that are not perfectly optimal, but the best that can be done 
given complex budgetary, political and administrative constraints.  And second, and 
again as Skoufias and Coady (2007) note, receipt of transfer benefits is contingent 
on enrolment.   
 
Means-testing impacts enrolment because it imposes a burden on otherwise 
legitimate recipients through 1). psychological stigmatisation (i.e. screening 
processes can be humiliating, for households where English is a second language 
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filling out forms can be overly complex, questioning can overlook sensitive cultural 
issues16, or individuals may be subjected to hostile screening interviews) and 2). 
pecuniary costs (including transaction costs).  Such characteristics are known to 
deter full participation (Besley, 1990; Oorschot, 2002). As Oorschot (2002) explains, 
citizens from genuinely vulnerable households do not always behave as calculating, 
well informed ‘surplus maximisers’ and consequently, participation rates frequently 
peak at 80%.  As a result, non take-up rates will remain a serious policy problem 
warranting continuous research in the field.  
 
In the meantime, changing the category targeting to include means-tested Health 
Cardholders, excluding non-means-tested Queensland Seniors Cardholders and 
altering the payment mechanism from $329pa to 22.5% of the bill is capable of 
delivering substantial improvements in the horizontal efficiency and vertical efficiency 
of Queensland’s longstanding customer hardship policy, and is therefore materially 
welfare enhancing.    
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